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Abstract 
Using panel data from Taiwan, this paper examines the impact of information asymmetry and 
client credit on lending performance. Banks without huge losses from bad debts and from 
credit card lending are categorized as high lending performance banks, whereas banks with 
heavy losses from bad debts and from credit card lending are categorized as low lending 
performance banks. Firms are also divided into micro and small businesses (MSBs) and 
medium and large businesses (MLBs). Logit regression is used to identify the determinants of 
lending performance, including the levels of information asymmetry and client credit records. 
The empirical results show that: (1) MLBs with good information transparency tend to 
establish relationships with banks that are characterized by huge losses from bad debts and 
from credit card lending. (2) Small foreign firms, as well as MLBs with high profitability, 
cash and R&D expenditure ratios prefer having relationships with banks with good lending 
performance and low credit risk. (3) MLBs and MSBs with poor credit records prefer having 
relationships with banks that have good lending performance and low credit risk.  
Keywords: Information asymmetry, Client credit record, Lending performance, Micro and 
small business, Medium and large business 
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1. Introduction 
During the period from 1997 to 2008, the Asian financial crisis (1997), the credit card storm 
(October 2005), the subprime mortgage (August 2007) and the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
events (July 2008) continually impacted Taiwan’s financial markets. Faced with these severe 
disasters, Taiwan responded by enacting its first and second financial reforms. The banking 
management system accompanied this change. This study uses the database managed by the 
Joint Credit Information Center to perform its empirical tests. We divided banks into those 
with or without huge losses from bad debts and heavy losses from credit card lending. We 
also divided firms into MSBs and MLBs. Information asymmetries with respect to the quality 
of the borrower’s assets and the accuracy of its credit risk estimates may raise the costs of 
credit risk management faced by bank credit officers. The situations are somewhat different 
according to the scale or the transparency level of the firms involved. The more opaque a 
firm is, the more that it is characterized by information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Kuo and Chen, 2012). To reduce the information asymmetry, 
the credit officer will ask borrowers to provide audited financial statements for the last three 
years when handling applications for loans. However, this requirement only applies to 
medium and large businesses (hereafter MLBs) where the capital or amount borrowed 
exceeds NT$30 million in Taiwan, and does not apply to micro and small businesses 
(hereafter MSBs). Therefore, in the cases where MSBs apply for loans, banks cannot check 
their financial position through their audited financial statements. In practice, banks can only 
use public information that can be accessed from the database of the Joint Credit Information 
Center (JCIC) to evaluate the firm’s credit quality. Among the available items, the most 
commonly used are the “credit records of borrowers” and “credit score of the chairperson” 
(Kuo and Chen, 2012). From the perspective of the lending management, banks require 
borrowers to file audited financial statements for the last three years. Banks verify the past 
credit records of the firms and the credit score of the chairperson1 by checking the 
information provided by JCIC. Therefore, it is important for banks to understand that when 
they use the information supplied by JCIC they will exhibit improved lending performance. 
Our purpose in this paper is to examine the impact of information asymmetry and client 
credit on lending performance. We extend the previous empirical work in several ways. First, 
for business confidentiality, prior research only includes the data from MLBs, but this study 
includes information from both MLBs and MSBs. We find that the loan behaviors of the two 
exhibit significant differences. Second, this study focuses on the business of corporate and 
retail finance in order to observe the impact of the factors related to lending performance. 
Third, the samples used also include clients who had been rejected by banks due to default or 
due to the fact that their credit scores were below the standard required but have now been 
approved for the loan process. We recognize that this approach can completely and 
comprehensively impact the factors influencing lending performance. 
It is important to distinguish between whether the lending performance improved with the 
enhanced lending system and whether the improvement in lending performance was simply 
due to a changing operating environment. Regulators and researchers are particularly 
interested in the lending performance of banks and market conditions have changed 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting  
ISSN 1946-052X 
2014, Vol. 6, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/ajfa 177
significantly for banks as the financial system in Taiwan has undergone drastic change. 
Therefore, the sample period selected in this study covers a time period in which the financial 
marketplace has undergone serious economic and financial environmental change. During 
this period, the Taiwan banking industry had experienced two major financial events, one 
being related to corporate finance and the other to retail finance. In accordance with Financial 
Statistics Monthly, issued by the Central Bank of Republic of China, we classify our samples 
into an empirical group (with more than NT$50 billion of accumulated bad debts written off 
in the five years prior to 2008, referred to as “WOBD” hereafter) and the control group2 
(without NT$50 billion in bad debts written off in the five years prior to 2008, referred to as 
without “WOBD” hereafter). We refer to the retail finance events as a credit card storm, and 
also divide the samples into an empirical group (with heavy credit card losses, hereafter 
referred to as “HCCL”) and a control group3 (without heavy credit card losses, hereafter 
referred to as without “HCCL”). 
In Taiwan, MLBs have more flexibility in raising capital. They can borrow from banks 
issuing commercial paper, straight bonds or convertible bonds4. However, MSBs can only 
borrow from banks. Therefore, we divide the borrowers into MSBs and MLBs5 while 
performing the statistical analysis and carrying out the tests. We look at the impact of 
information asymmetry and client credit on lending performance for different sizes of firms. 
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that lending performance may differ by type of banks due 
to different risks from corporate and retail finance. Thus, we divide the banks into banks with 
and without heavy losses from corporate or retail finance. In a nutshell, our samples are 
classified as consisting of borrowers obtaining finance from banks with “WOBD” or without 
“WOBD” and borrowers obtaining finance from banks with “HCCL” or without “HCCL”. To 
clarify the direct and indirect impacts of the differences in corporate and retail finance, we 
deliberately verify the impacts of the events individually6. All banks are simply divided into 
banks “with” and “without” “WOBD” and “HCCL”, to reflect the level of lending 
performance and credit risk. 
The empirical work is summarized as follows: (1) By comparing the information asymmetry 
and client credit7 for banks with and without “WOBD” through the use of the t-statistics test 
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we examine whether there are significant 
differences for these two types of banks. (2) By comparing the information asymmetry and 
client credit for banks with and without “HCCL” using the t-statistics test and the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we examine whether there are significant 
differences between these two types of banks. (3) We then segment the samples into 
high-performance and low-performance banks based on “WOBD”. Banks with “WOBD” are 
categorized as banks with low-performance and high credit risk, whereas banks without 
“WOBD are categorized as having high-performance and low credit risk. The logistic 
regression models each have a set of independent variables, including information asymmetry 
and client credit. Using the logit model, we investigate whether the borrowers’ information 
asymmetry and credit records contain statistically significant differences among the banks 
with and without “WOBD”. (4) Finally, we regard banks with “HCCL” as the banks with 
low-performance and high credit risk (the value of the dependent variable in the empirical 
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model equals 1). By contrast, we regard banks without “HCCL” as those banks with 
high-performance and low credit risk (the value of the dependent variable equals 0). Using a 
logit model, we investigate whether the borrowers’ information asymmetries and credit 
records are characterized by statistically significant differences between the banks with and 
those without “HCCL”. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
Myers and Majluf (1984) indicated that firms that have been in existence for only a short time 
and firms that are small in size tend to be characterized by severe information asymmetry, 
and therefore banks are reluctant to lend to them. These firms thus face severe financing 
difficulties. Lummer and McConnell (1989), however, found that creditor banks are still 
willing to lend to borrowers with asymmetric information. This conveys a positive message 
to the external investors, thereby reducing the information asymmetry condition. Agarwal 
and Eiston (2001) indicated that firms with better operating structures would like to borrow 
from banks with a better credit quality in order to receive a better appraisal from the 
enterprise’s external investors. Kuo and Chen (2012) found that the asymmetries between the 
borrowing customers and creditor banks may differ depending on the respective sizes of the 
firm. The smaller the scale of the opaque firms, the more severe is the information 
asymmetry. In respect of the research and switching costs, Diamond (1989), Boot and Thakor 
(1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) all found that banks will charge a lower price to reflect 
the reduction in research costs. When borrowers are aware of the high costs of switching 
banks, they will be strongly motivated to continue dealing with the original bank and will pay 
less attention to the changes in the bank’s credit risk. 
In practice, MSBs in Taiwan actually distort their financial statements through a variety of 
methods. Therefore, banks cannot accurately evaluate the credit risk of borrowers by 
examining their financial characteristics purely based on their financial statements. Therefore, 
within the banking industry8, in addition to the financial data, they also resort to non-financial 
measures to evaluate the lending case. Ruan and Jing (2003) used samples consisting of 
medium-sized and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and found that by combining 
financial information with non-financial information they could achieve the best lending 
performance. Li (2005) included all the variables for credit rating in the logistic regression 
model and built models of financial indicators, non-financial indicators and integrated 
indicators. His results suggest that the most accurate prediction rate provided by these three 
empirical models was that of the integrated indicators’ model, especially when it came to 
predicting the default rate of the firms, followed by the empirical model for the financial 
indicators. The worst model was that which only used non-financial indicators.  
From the perspective of the variables used to describe lending management, Zhang et al. 
(2006) found that if the empirical model included a dummy variable to distinguish the 
borrower’s industry, the model’s accuracy was generally better than it was without that 
dummy. In the empirical tests for SME lending cases, Zeng et al. (2009) found that the 
financial information provided the ability to distinguish between defaulting corporations and 
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normal corporations. Ruan and Jiang (2004) conducted a study on the default predictions for 
privately-held companies that did not file audited financial statements, and found that the 
credit rating, the frequency of inquiries, the rate of utilization of the amount of credit and the 
payment record significantly increased the ability of banks to discriminate between the 
various applications for loans. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
According to Taiwan’s lending practices, when applying for bank loans, MLBs should 
provide audited financial statements for the past three years, and inquiries should be made 
through JCIC to ascertain the credit score of the chairperson and whether or not the MLBs 
and MSBs have had bad credit records in the past. However, as to whether these practices can 
enhance the lending performance and reduce the credit risk is a matter worth systematic 
investigation. Past empirical studies have been more focused on how the ownership type, 
scale and transaction frequency have impacted the banking relationship. To our knowledge, 
there are no studies using “WOBD” and “HCCL” that have sought to reflect bank lending 
performance and further explore how the information asymmetry and credit records of the 
borrowers impact lending performance. Based on our understanding, banks that belong to the 
“WOBD” category are always large in scale and banks that belong to the “HCCL” category 
are mixed, including large and small banks. Most of the “HCCL” banks are 
newly-established banks. Therefore, we refer to the following relevant articles in developing 
our hypotheses: “Careless Lenders and Bad Borrowers, “(Shen and Wang, 2002), “The Top 
One and Non-top One Financing Bank–viewpoints of lending behavior,” (Chen and Lai, 
2003). Berger et al. (2008) referred to the five relationships motivation theory9 which also 
provided us with the inspiration to predict the positive or negative directions of our results. 
The following four hypotheses are presented and discussed: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with more transparent information are more likely to have their loan 
applications approved, regardless of whether the lending performance of the bank is good or 
bad. 
According to the past research literature, large banks have advantages with hard information; 
however, small banks make the most of soft information to develop new clients. Banks with 
“WOBD” often happen to be large banks, but “HCCL” occurs in any kind of bank. 
Regardless of the scale or the lending performance of the banks, they all prefer to lend to 
enterprises with more transparent information. The preference level may be associated with 
the lending type, scale and performance.10 Another possible reason why banks have a 
different attitude towards credit risk is the dramatic change in the competitive banking 
environment11 in Taiwan. Because of this, in addition to using the measures of scale and 
length of time in existence to reflect the level of information asymmetry, we also include a 
measure referred to as “before or after the approval of the policy for the establishment of new 
banks”. To sum up, firms with more capital and assets, that have been in existence for a 
longer period of time, and that received their loans “before or after the approval of the policy 
for the establishment of new banks” will be deemed to be more transparent and with less 
shortage of information asymmetry. Such firms and their loan applications are welcomed by 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting  
ISSN 1946-052X 
2014, Vol. 6, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/ajfa 180
any kind of bank. If banks with and without “WOBD” contain significant differences in 
information transparency, this may indicate that banks without “WOBD” place more 
emphasis on information transparency. The same inferences apply to banks without “HCCL”. 
Hypothesis 2: It is easier for borrowers with a better credit history to establish relationships 
with banks, regardless of the bank’s lending performance. However, whether or not a bank 
with low performance will reduce its contact with borrowers with a bad credit history to 
avoid incurring a high non-performing loan (hereafter NPL) ratio has yet to be verified. The 
same question applies to banks with a low performance, but that have had previous 
relationships with borrowers with a bad credit history. Banks with high lending performance 
prefer to do business with firms whose chairperson has a good credit score. This is not 
usually the case for banks with low lending performance.  
According to the efficient frontier in portfolio theory, banks should pursue the highest rate of 
return within the specified risk appetite. Banks should choose the optimal client and assume a 
reasonable amount of credit risk, but not always look for the best borrower12. If a potential 
client has had a bad credit record in the past, it is right for a bank to deal with such a case in a 
prudent manner. Different banks deal with such cases in different ways. While some banks 
may abandon this type of business to avoid a high NPL ratio, other banks are attracted by a 
high loan spread, all of which depends on the firm’s situation and lending performance. From 
the perspective of the borrower, as long as the borrower can raise sufficient funds to meet its 
debt capacity and loan interest rates are still low, then the borrower will be more willing to 
make contact with any kind of bank, without considering whether its lending performance is 
good or bad. Many studies on the Taiwan economy have shown that, unless policy-related 
subsidies or government relief measures are in place when banks face such loan applications 
from borrowers, the banks will normally ask firms to provide collateral. They will also look 
to see if the chairperson’s credit score is above the threshold criteria, and will require a 
guarantee from the chairperson13. 
Hypothesis 3: Borrowers that are publicly-held firms, or belong to conglomerates, and have 
lower industry concentration risk are more attractive to any kind of banks. Large foreign 
companies are commonly multi-national, have good reputations and have a need to raise 
funds, and so they are more willing to build a relationship with any kind of bank. Small 
foreign companies in Taiwan would rather choose a steady relationship with one bank that 
has a good lending performance within this over-banking environment. 
The fifth motivation theory regarding the banking relationship discussed in Berger et al. 
(2008) and Kuo and Chen (2012) emphasizes the importance of the cost and benefit of 
monitoring. Therefore, banks with good lending performance (without “WOBD” and 
“HCCL”) prefer having relationships with listed and OTC companies rather than with 
publicly-held companies. However, they would also prefer having relationships with 
publicly-held companies than with privately-held companies. They usually adopt the same 
approach with MSBs. Banks still prefer having relationships with corporations to 
relationships with proprietorships, partnerships or limited companies. It must also be 
understood that companies that are publicly-held respond differently to a bank’s credit risk 
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and performance, and vice versa. If a borrower is a member of a conglomerate and belongs to 
a high-tech or traditional industry, it needs to be asked whether this will affect the preferences 
of banks. It actually depends on whether the risk associated with the secured or unsecured 
loan related to the borrower or affiliated company exceeds the risk limits and industry 
concentration risk approved by the bank. According to the first and second motivation 
theories of banking relationships, if the borrower’s predetermined scale of debt is greater than 
the risk appetite of the bank, then it will be rejected, and the borrower will then deal with 
another bank. However, it cannot be determined for certain whether the borrower will 
determine its banking preference according to a bank’s lending performance. In this paper, 
we also use the marginal value generated from the empirical models of “WOBD” and 
“HCCL” to predict the sensitivity to lending performance. Previous studies indicate that 
foreign enterprises prefer relationships with foreign banks. There are no obvious conclusions 
as to whether foreign enterprises will change their behavior based on a foreign bank’s credit 
risk. We will conduct empirical tests in this paper, too. 
Hypothesis 4: MLBs with higher financial leverage induce higher financial risk. To fulfill 
their cash needs, MLBs with higher financial leverage tend to build relationships with banks 
regardless of the bank’s lending performance. When the R&D expenditure to total capital 
ratio, profitability ratio and cash ratio (measured by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to 
sales) are enhanced, due to the fact that funding pressure is reduced, these MLBs will tend to 
build relationships with banks with low credit risk and better lending performance. 
According to the viewpoints of Brick-Palia (2007), the lower financial leverage ratio, higher 
profitability ratio, and cash ratio will lead to lower loan spreads. This means that when banks 
perceive that certain clients have a low credit risk, they will be more willing to use lower 
interest rates to establish a relationship with them. When the clients’ financial indicators, as 
mentioned above, reflect the expected level, banks with different lending performances will 
be eager to provide sufficient funds to meet their needs and to establish relationships with 
them. However, whether the motives for building relationships contain significant differences 
is still uncertain. It is thus good to show that clients are running their businesses soundly 
when the ratio of R&D expenditures increases, because this implies that the clients use 
long-term debt or funds to support their need for long-term intellectual capital. It is quite 
common for banks with different lending performances to be keen to meet their borrowers’ 
financing needs, but it is worth deeply examining whether the lending motivation is different. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data sources 
In Taiwan, the Joint Credit Information Center (JCIC) is a unique organization that is 
constantly collecting the credit information data of both individuals and enterprises. These 
data are collected from financial institutions on a long-term basis. The factors that influence 
the credit risk of enterprise borrowers are more complicated than those that influence the 
credit risk of individual borrowers. It is for this reason that this study focuses on examining 
samples of enterprise borrowers and ignores the issues of individual borrowers. Our data 
sources are the JCIC database established in 2007. To effectively reflect the credit records 
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and credit scores of the businesses and their chairpersons, we use the population14 
information on the enterprises followed by JCIC.  In addition, to grasp the real picture of the 
lending performance in the case of firms with and without “WOBD” and “HCCL”, we 
purposely choose the empirical period 2006-2008, a time period that followed the two 
important financial events referred to earlier. Our observations are focused on the new loan 
cases of the creditor banks15. In considering the principle of materiality and the 
representativeness of the data, the relationship banks should be in the list of the top 20 banks, 
as measured by the amounts lent to the clients.  
As mentioned before, we use data from JCIC to investigate the information asymmetry and 
credit records of borrowers associated with banks with different lending performances. The 
samples used in this study consist of borrowing firms16 and their lending banks. We define 
the borrowing firms as MSBs (a total of 122,759 firms) where their capital and amounts 
borrowed are less than NT$30 million at the same time. When either of the capital and 
amounts borrowed exceed NT$30 million, we define the borrowing firms as MLBs (a total of 
31,314 firms). Moreover, we divide the MLBs17 into three kinds of organizations, “Listed or 
over-the-counter (OTC)” (1,174 firms), “Publicly held but not listed or OTC” (966 firms) and 
“Privately-held with audited financial statements” (15,908 firms).18 The MSBs contained in 
the database of the JCIC are privately-held businesses that do not file audited financial 
statements with the lending banks. We further divide those businesses into “proprietorships, 
partnerships and limited companies” (89,295 firms) and “corporation” (33,464 firms). 
We divide the borrowers’ industries into the following four categories19: electronic 
manufacturing industry (MSBs 2,530, MLBs 2,265), non-electronic manufacturing industry 
(MSBs 31,590, MLBs 10,203), wholesale and retail business (MSBs 56,794, MLBs 8,107) 
and other industries (mainly consisting of construction, real estate and investment industries 
(MSBs 31,845, MLBs 10,739). We use WOBD and HCCL to distinguish banks with high or 
low credit risk and operating performance. Among banks with “WOBD”, we have selected 
57,948 MSBs and 10,023 MLBs. Among banks without “WOBD”, we have selected 75,619 
MSBs and 5,691 MLBs. Among banks with “HCCL”, we have selected 35,369 MSBs and 
5,343 MLBs, and among banks without “HCCL”, we have selected 98,198 MSBs and 10,371 
MLBs. There are 513 listed, 404 OTC, 133 emerging stock and 166 companies publicly-held 
but not included in the former three markets, giving a total of 1,210 companies used in this 
study.  
3.2 Operational Definition of Variables 
In order to explore whether the lending performance was impacted by information asymmetry 
and credit records, we grouped the factors into four dimensions and nineteen independent 
variables as follows: (1) Level of asymmetric information (the dimension symbol is Info). 
Info includes the size of the borrowers. (The sizes of MSBs and MLBs are measured by 
capital registered and total assets, respectively. We take the natural logarithm of capital 
registered and total assets as the proxy for firm size. The variables’ symbols are Info_01 and 
Info_02, respectively.) The second variable of Info is existing length, measured by months 
(the variable is Info_03). The third variable of Info is when the borrowing firm was founded. 
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(Before or after the deregulation to allow the establishment of new banks, the variable is 
Info_04. Which is a dummy variable and we denote the value as 1 when the borrower was 
found before 1993 otherwise the value is 0.) (2) Organization and industry type of the 
borrowers (the dimension symbol is Com). In MLB sample, we use two dummy variables 
(Com_01 and Com_02) to distinguish between listed, OTC, publicly-held and privately-held 
companies.  If the company belongs to listed firms, the dummy variable Com_01 equal 1, 
otherwise the value is 0. If the company belongs to OTC firms, the dummy variable Com_02 
equal 1, otherwise the value is 0. In the MSB sample, we use the dummy variable Com_03 to 
distinguish between corporations, proprietorships, partnerships and limited companies. When 
the MSB belongs to corporation the dummy variable equal 1, otherwise the value is 0. We 
use Com_04 to distinguish whether or not the borrowing company belongs to a conglomerate 
if yes the dummy variable equals 1, otherwise the value is 0. We then use the dummy 
variables Com_05 and Com_06 to distinguish between foreign, state-owned or domestic 
companies. If the borrower belongs to foreign firms, the dummy variable Com_05 equals 1, 
otherwise the value is 0. If the borrower belongs to state-owned the dummy variable Com_06 
equals 1, otherwise the value is 0. We also use the dummy variables Com_07, Com_08, 
Com_09 to distinguish four kinds of industry: electronic manufacturing, non-electronic 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and others (including the construction, real estate, and 
investment industries). If the borrower belongs to electronic manufacturing, the dummy 
variable Com_07 equals 1, otherwise the value is 0. If the borrower belongs to non-electronic 
manufacturing, the dummy variable Com_08 equals 1, otherwise the value is 0. If the 
borrower belongs to wholesale and retail, the dummy variable Com_09 equals 1, otherwise 
the value is 0. (3) Financial characteristics of the borrowers (the dimension symbol is Fin). 
Given that MLBs should file audited financial statements with the lending banks, in our 
empirical model, only MLBs are included in the dimension of financial variables. The 
financial variables of the borrowers include the financial leverage ratio (measured by total 
liabilities over total equities (%), Fin_01), the R&D expenditure ratio (measured by total 
R&D expenses over total equities (%), Fin_02), the profitability ratio20 (measured by EBIT 
over sales (%), Fin_03), and the cash ratio (measured by cash-in-hand and cash equivalent 
over sales (%), Fin_04). (4) Credit records of borrowers (The dimension symbol is Credit). 
This refers to whether the borrowers have faced the situation where their loans are overdue, 
they have defaulted, have incurred bad debts or not sufficient fund (NSF) (Credit_01). We 
also measure the credit rating score21 of the chairperson of the borrowing firm (the symbol is 
Credit_02). (The relevant magnitudes are obtained from the database of JCIC window J10.) 
As mentioned before, we use with or without WOBD and with or without HCCL to measure 
the lending performances of the sample banks. (The dimension symbol is Status, and the two 
dependent variables are Status_01 and Status_02.) If the bank has written off over NT$50 
billion of bad debts within the last 5 years, the dependent dummy variable Status_01 equals 1, 
otherwise the dummy variable’s value is 0. The same principles and procedures are applied to 
HCCL. When a bank has experienced heavy credit card loss, the dependent dummy variable 
Status_02 equals 1, otherwise the dummy variable’s value is 0. 
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Table 1. Summary of Dimensions and Variables 
Dimensions Attributes Variable Symbols 
Lending Performance Dependent dummy variables Status_01, Status_02 
Info (Level of Asymmetric 
Information ) 
 
Size Info_01 for MSBs, Info_02 
for MLBs 
Existing length Info_03 
Company established before 
or after 1993 
Info_04 
Com (Organization and 
Industry Types of the 
Borrowers) 
 
Organization types Com_01, Com_02 for MLBs 
Com_03 for MSBs 
Conglomerate Com_04 
Ownership Com_05, Com_06 
Industry classification Com_07,Com_08 Com_09 
Fin (Financial 
Characteristics of the 
Borrowers) 
 
Financial leverage Fin_01 
R&D ratio Fin_02 
Profitability ratio Fin_03 
Cash ratio Fin_04 
Credit (Credit Records of 
Borrowers) 
 
Borrower with or without 
bad credit record in the past 
Credit_01 
Credit score of chairperson Credit_02 
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
We use logit regression to identify the determinants of lending performance. We examine 
how the information asymmetry and client credit records of the MSBs and MLBs impact the 
lending performance. According to the respective impacts of corporate finance and retail 
finance, we divide the credit risk and performance into two types: one is impacted by 
corporate finance referred to as with or without “WOBD”, the other is impacted by retail 
finance, and is referred to as with or without “HCCL”. We develop a separate model to 
perform the empirical testing. When using the with or without “WOBD” model, the sample 
borrowers are selected from the corresponding banks. If the sample firms borrow from the 
bank with “WOBD”, the value of the dependent variable of the empirical logit model is 1, 
otherwise it is 022. 
The same principles apply to with or without “HCCL” model. If the sample data are from a 
bank with “HCCL”, the value of the dependent variable of the empirical logit model is 1, 
otherwise it is 0. This study not only considers the difference in lending performance but also 
considers a firm’s scale, because the attributes of the MSBs and MLBs that exist are 
obviously different (Kuo and Chen, 2012.). Because of this, we develop two models to be 
applied for MSBs and MLBs. The empirical logit models are demonstrated as formulas (1) 
and (2). 
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Formula (1) depicts the factors impacting the lending performance in relation to MSBs, while 
Formula (2) also depicts the factors impacting the lending performance in regard to MLBs. 
Both formulas include the dimensions of Info (level of information asymmetry), Com 
(organization and industry types) and Credit (credit records of borrowers), but only Formula 
(2) for MLBs includes the dimension of Fin (financial characteristic of borrowers). The 
variables are described in Table 1. 
4. Empirical Results 
We will summarize the empirical testing process over the next three subsections. First, we use 
the t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test to verify whether the mean and median 
are significantly different from the perspectives of information asymmetry and client credit in 
banks with and without “WOBD” and “HCCL”. As mentioned earlier, we divide borrowers 
into MSBs and MLBs and discuss each one separately. In the second and third sections, we 
discuss how the borrowers with their own advantage or situation build relationships with 
banks with different levels of credit risk and lending performance. To be specific, we regard 
banks with “WOBD” and “HCCL” as banks with low performance and high credit risk. Our 
control sample consists of banks without “WOBD” and “HCCL” and with high performance 
and low credit risk. We use a logit model to investigate whether the borrowers' information 
asymmetry and credit records contain statistically significant differences between banks with 
and without “WOBD” and “HCCL”.  
4.1 Whether or not the Borrowers are Significantly Different  
4.1.1 Comparisons among MSBs 
Table 2 displays the findings that banks with “WOBD” and “HCCL” prefer dealing with 
MSBs that are relatively large in scale. The average capital ranges between NT$0.028 billion 
and NT$0.033 billion, which is significantly higher than the controlled samples23 with 
between NT$0.017 billion and NT$0.018 billion at the 1% level. Compared with factors for 
the length of time in existence (in months) and the year of establishment, we find that banks 
with “WOBD” prefer building relationships with MSBs characterized by longer lengths of 
time in existence. Banks with “HCCL” show no significant differences in this respect. 
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Compared with the median of existing length, banks with “WOBD” have existed for an 
average of 158 months, which is significantly longer than for banks without “WOBD”, for 
which the average is 140 months. The former generally had more clients and a more 
sustained borrower-lender relationship before the new bank policy to approve the 
establishment of new banks was introduced. The ratio is significantly higher than the latter at 
the 1% level. Compared to sole proprietorships, partnerships and limited companies, banks 
with “WOBD” engage in more lending business with corporations. The ratio is 34%, which is 
significantly higher than the 30% for the control sample. Banks with “HCCL” prefer 
relationships with clients that are sole proprietorships, partnerships or limited companies than 
with corporate types of organizations. The ratio is 29%, which is significantly lower than that 
for banks without “HCCL” (32%).  
As to whether MSBs that belong to conglomerates can decrease or increase the risks posed to 
the creditor banks with different lending performances presents a severe challenge to the 
banks’ ability to manage credit. The empirical results show that the ratios of the clients 
belonging to conglomerates that build relationships with banks with “WOBD and HCCL” are 
0.4% and 0.5%, respectively, which are significantly higher than those for the control 
samples with 0.3% and 0.3% at the 1% level. This indicates that lending to companies 
belonging to a conglomerate does not ensure that the quality of credit is reliable (for banks 
with “WOBD”). If banks lend to a subsidiary of a conglomerate, they will be concerned 
about the efficiency or performance of any related business unit related to that conglomerate, 
because the whole conglomerate may be affected. Another empirical result shows that banks 
without “WOBD and HCCL” will tend to lend to small foreign companies, for which the 
ratios are 0.3% and 0.3%, significantly higher than those for the control samples of 0.1% and 
0.1%. The implication is that small foreign companies pose less credit risk, and so it is 
reasonable to promote business lending to them. Lending in the cases of banks with “WOBD 
and HCCL”, which carry poor credit records are up to 22% and 26%, which were 
significantly higher than the control samples of 17% and 17%. This explains why these banks 
have a higher credit risk. When comparing from the aspect of the credit score of the 
chairperson, the empirical results are quite similar in that cases of lending by banks with 
“WOBD and HCCL” have an average credit ratings of 509.72 and 473.63, respectively, 
which is significantly lower than the 541.45 and 548.28 for the control samples. 
4.1.2 Comparison among MLBs 
From the results of Table 2, we found that the lending behaviors of banks with different 
lending performances were quite similar, including in terms of asset size, the length of time in 
existence and the company’s year of establishment. This means that banks with “WOBD and 
HCCL” prefer building relationships with large-scale companies, whose average total assets 
are between NT$1,536 million and NT$2,481 million. These averages are significantly larger 
than those for the control samples where the average total assets were between NT$526 and 
NT$495 million at the 1% level. From the perspective of the length of time in existence and 
the company’s year of establishment in the case of the MLBs, banks with “HCCL” were 
significantly smaller than banks without “HCCL” at the 5% level. Variables related to banks 
with “WOBD” were significantly larger those for than banks without “WOBD” at the 1% 
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level. From the perspective of the type of organization, banks with “WOBD and HCCL” 
preferred building relationships with publicly-held or OTC firms (8% and 12%), which were 
significantly higher than those for the control samples (4% and 4%) at the 1% level. For 
clients belonging to conglomerates (13% and 19%), the ratios were significantly higher than 
for the control samples (7% and 7%) at the 1% level. 
As to the comparison of the financial variables, we found that clients of banks with “WOBD” 
had a significantly higher financial leverage ratio (the mean was 246.13%) than the control 
samples (230.44%) at the 1% level. The median rose to 200.59%. This seems to indicate that 
banks with “WOBD” accept lending business from MLBs with a higher financial leverage 
ratio which will lead to higher credit risk. The means of the MLBs of banks with “HCCL” are 
0.98% and 5.31% based on the ratios of R&D expenditures and profitability, which are 
significantly higher than the corresponding 0.58% and 4.08% for the control samples at the 
1% level. The cash ratio of 9.89% is significantly lower than the 11.83% for the control 
samples at the same level. This reveals that when compared to the R&D expenditures and 
profitability ratios, the cash ratio can better reflect the quality of credit risk. From the 
perspective of the past credit records of banks with different lending performances, there is 
no significant difference between the experimental and control samples. The credit score of 
the chairperson of MLBs of banks with “WOBD and HCCL” (the average scores are 644.32 
and 628.96, and the medians are 656 and 639) is significantly lower than for the control 
samples (the average scores are 657.81 and 659.91, and the medians are 673 and 674) at the 
1% level. This seems to reflect the fact that banks with low lending performance ignore the 
fact that the credit score of the chairperson can serve as a signal of credit risk. 
4.2. The Logit Model Distinguished by with or without “WOBD” Events 
In this study, we measure a bank’s lending performance according to whether it encounters 
the events of “WOBD” and “HCCL.” Therefore, we divide the relationship banks into those 
with “WOBD” and those with “HCCL.” For purposes of comparison, we also choose the 
clients of banks without “WOBD” and “HCCL” as the control samples24. With respect to the 
borrowers, “WOBD” results from corporate financial failure and impacts the financing needs 
directly, while “HCCL” results from retail financing failure, which only impacts financing 
needs indirectly. However, each circumstance will increase the credit risk of banks. If bad 
experiences accrue at the same time, the credit risk will increase dramatically. To clarify the 
different responses from the direct and indirect impacts, we test both events individually, and 
simply divide the banks into those with or without “WOBD” or “HCCL”. Banks with 
“WOBD” and “HCCL” are characterized by high credit risk and low lending performance. 
Banks without “WOBD” and “HCCL” are characterized by low credit risk and high lending 
performance. To avoid confused perceptions of lending behavior, we exclude the samples of 
borrowers who maintain relationships with banks with both high and low credit risks.  
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Table 2. Comparison of MSBs and MLBs from Different Perspectives  
D
im
ensions 
Impact Variables 
Borrowers: MSBs Borrowers: MLBs 
  “WOBD” Events  “HCCL” Events “WOBD” Events  “HCCL” Events 
Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Samples 57,948 75,619 35,369 98,198 10,023 5,691 5,343 10,371 
Info 
Info_01 or 
Info_02 
M 0.28*** 0.17 0.33*** 0.18 5.26 24.81*** 4.95 4.95 
m 0.05*** 0.05 0.05*** 0.05 1.33 2.37*** 1.4 1.4 
Info_03  
M 172.99*** 156.57 152*** 167.98 204.88 217.52** 222.95 222.95 
m 158*** 140 134*** 154 189 199*** 209 209 
Info_04 
M 0.46*** 0.4 0.37*** 0.44 0.56 0.6*** 0.63 0.63 
m 0*** 0 0*** 0 1 1*** 1 1 
Fin 
Fin_01 
M - - - - 230.44 236.36** 242.55 242.55 
m - - - - 179.07 194.23 192.10 192.10 
Fin_02 
M - - - - 0.69 0.98*** 0.58 0.58 
m - - - - 0 0*** 0 0 
Fin_03 
M - - - - 4.59 5.31*** 4.08 4.08 
m - - - - 2.84 3.24*** 2.68 2.68 
Fin_04 
M - - - - 13.46 9.89*** 11.83 11.83 
m - - - - 6.97 5.39*** 6.16 6.16 
C
redit 
Credit_01 
M 0.22*** 0.17 0.26*** 0.17 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
m 0*** 0 0*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Credit_02 
M 509.72*** 541.45 473.63*** 548.28 657.81 628.96*** 659.91 659.91 
m 624*** 640 580*** 647 673 639*** 674 674 
Note 1: The symbols Y and N indicate that the events occur and do not occur. The mean (M) and ymedian (m) 
of the variables in each dimension are examined by t and the Wilcoxon rank sum tests. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Note 2: For simplicity, Table 2 does not present the descriptive statistics of the dummy variable 
Com_01-Com_09 in dimension Com. 
 
The empirical findings in Table 3 indicate that enterprises featured by “large size and a long 
period of time in existence” have good information transparency and tend to25 build 
relationships with banks with “WOBD”. The coefficients of the regression model for MSBs 
are 0.18 and 0.001, and for MLBs are 0.30 and 0.009, respectively. Although “large size and 
a long period of time in existence” are symbols of good information transparency, they are 
not an assurance of less operating risk. Therefore banks should deal with loan applications 
more prudently, especially during times of recession. If banks do not have a sound risk 
limiting system, nor a facilities ratings system to manage industry concentration risk and they 
blindly adopt the lending business practices of borrowers with highly transparent information, 
they may suffer considerable losses in the near future. This phenomenon has become even 
more severe due to the lending market facing intense competition after the announcement of 
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the policy to approve the establishment of new banks. Banks with high credit risk purposely 
expand and extend their conditions and criteria of lending to attract new and opaque 
companies (the coefficient is -0.04). From the perspective of the organization type and 
industry of the enterprise, compared to private enterprises, foreign companies prefer 
establishing relationship with low credit risk bank (the coefficient is -1.02). Compared to sole 
proprietorships, partnerships and limited companies, it seems that corporations prefer 
building relationships with low credit risk banks (the coefficient is -0.04). Compared to the 
construction and real estate industry, it seems that firms within the electronic and the 
non-electronic manufacturing industries and wholesale industries (the coefficients are 0.11, 
0.06 and 0.24, respectively) prefer to build relationships with high credit risk bank. 
Compared to privately-held companies, it seems that publicly-held companies (the coefficient 
is 0.28, and the odds ratio is 1.32) prefer to build relationships with high credit risk banks. 
Compared to publicly-held companies, it seems that listed and OTC firms (the coefficient is 
0.33, and the odds ratio is 1.4) prefer to establish relationships with high credit risk banks. 
This implies that such banks do not have a comprehensive understanding of the industrial 
environment. Although higher public offerings will accompany those companies with more 
transparency, they do not guarantee better profitability. Hence, it is beneficial to remain alert 
when dealing with clients in such situations to reduce risk and enhance performance. 
From the perspective of the borrower’s financial variables, large clients with high 
profitability ratios, cash ratios and R&D expenditure ratios prefer building relationships with 
banks with low credit risk (the coefficients are -0.004, -0.009 and -0.025, respectively). Only 
companies with high financial leverage ratios select or are accepted by banks with high credit 
risk (the coefficient is 0.0005). However, it is not worthwhile adopting such lending business 
at the expense of increasing credit risk. Both MSBs and MLBs with poor credit records prefer 
building relationships with low credit risk banks (the coefficient in large companies is -2.12, 
which is significant at the 1% level). If the credit score of the borrower’s chairperson is 
increasing, it will tend to access finance from low credit risk banks. The coefficients of the 
MSBs and MLBs are -0.0006 and -0.0035, respectively. This perhaps reflects the fact that 
banks with low credit risk have low liquidity risk. Therefore, they should be concerned about 
the prospects of such a company and only with caution agree to meet the financing demands 
of the company. It is critical to only proceed if the bank receives assurances from the 
chairperson or directors or supervisors.  
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Table 3. Using Logit Model to Distinguish Credit Risk by “WOBD” Event 
Dimensions Status_01 MSBs Odd Ratio MLBs Odd Ratio 
 intercept 0.283***  2.2194***  
Info 
Info_01  0.1801*** 1.197   
Info_02   0.2966*** 1.345 
Info_03   0.00105*** 1.001 0.0009*** 1.001 
Info_04 -0.0417** 0.959 0.1412** 1.152 
Com 
 
Com_01   0.2787** 1.321 
Com_02   0.3326*** 1.395 
Com_03  -0.0429*** 0.958   
Com_04 -0.1043 0.901 -0.0962 0.908 
Com_05  -1.0232*** 0.359 -0.9261 0.396 
Com_06 0.0492 1.05 8.5285 >999.999 
 Com_07 0.1149*** 1.122 0.0115 1.012 
 Com_08 0.0553*** 1.057 0.0737 1.077 
 Com_09 0.2391*** 1.27 0.4329*** 1.542 
Fin 
Fin_01   0.00054*** 1.001 
Fin_02   -0.0247*** 0.976 
Fin_03   -0.00422*** 0.996 
 Fin_04   -0.00934*** 0.991 
Credit 
Credit_01 -0.00755 0.992 -2.1188*** 0.12 
Credit_02 -0.00056*** 0.999 -0.00348*** 0.997 
Note 1: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Note 2: The Likelihood Ratio (Chi-square value) of the Logit Model for MSBs is 2,348.45, and the Likelihood 
Ratio (Chi-square value) of the Logit Model for MLBs is 936.47, which shows that the model had good fit at 
the 1% level. 
 
4.3. The Logit Model Distinguished by with or without “HCCL” Events 
“HCCL” arises due to the failure of the retail financing business. Although the clients differ 
from the clients in the case of corporate finance, “HCCL” is still an indicator of credit risk 
management. When banks experience “HCCL” and maintain high NPL ratios, they still have 
the capacity to finance clients with information asymmetry and poor credit. This is worth 
carefully exploring. In this section we focus on investigating how “HCCL” banks with high 
credit risk affect the borrowers’ funding needs.  
The empirical findings in Table 4 show that both MSBs and MLBs that are larger scale prefer 
building relationships with banks that are categorized as being with “HCCL” (the coefficients 
are 0.066 and 0.397, respectively, and the odds ratio of the latter reaches as high as 1.487). 
Companies that have been in existence for a shorter period of time are more opaque, and 
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therefore creditors need to be careful to grasp the overall picture of potential operating risk. 
Banks with “HCCL” are more willing to deal with such enterprises (the coefficients of MSBs 
and MLBs are -0.0004 and -0.0011, respectively). Banks with “HCCL” are more eager to 
deal with MSBs established after the policy to approve the establishment of new banks was 
introduced (the coefficient is -0.193). There is no doubt that the NPL ratio remains high. 
Banks with “HCCL” do not wish to deal with corporations among the MSBs (the coefficient 
compared to the sole proprietorships, partnerships, and limited companies is -0.181). This is 
similar to banks with “WOBD” as mentioned in the previous section. Only the MSBs 
belonging to a conglomerate (the coefficient is 0.467, and the odds ratio is 1.595) can ignore 
the credit risk of its lending banks, for the conglomerate can back up its member businesses 
internally with funding needs. However, the conglomerates with poor internal controls may 
deliberately deal with banks with high credit risk, act in collusion and empty the assets of the 
enterprise on purpose. Compared to the privately-held firms, small foreign enterprises are 
more likely to refuse to deal with banks with “HCCL” (the coefficient is -0.899). Most of the 
“HCCL” banks are newly established. It is understood that they actively promote retail 
finance and intend to expand the market of privately-held companies. For this reason, it is 
understood that more risk management is needed. 
The empirical results also indicate that in comparing listed companies with publicly-held 
companies and publicly-held companies with privately-held companies, the former prefer 
building relationships with banks with “HCCL” (the coefficients are 0.391 and 0.563, and the 
odd ratios are 1.48 and 1.71, respectively). There are no differences in ownership types, 
regardless of their being stated-owned or privately-owned or even foreign banks. MLBs with 
high cash and R&D expenditure ratios regularly deal with banks without “HCCL” (the 
coefficients are -0.007 and -0.031). These findings fully reflect the fact that banks with 
“WOBD and HCCL” have a shortage of knowledge in terms of analyzing financial 
statements. MLBs with high financial leverage regularly and positively deal with “HCCL” 
banks (the coefficient is 0.0003). This implies that those banks that perform poorly in the 
management of retail finance will perform poorly in the management of corporate finance, 
too. MLBs with high or low profitability keep maintain the same attitude in dealing with 
banks with or without “HCCL”. Companies with poor credit records, regardless of whether 
they are MSBs or MLBs, will tend to build relationships with low credit risk banks without 
“HCCL”. Compared to MSBs, the intentions of MLBs are 4 times higher (the coefficients are 
-0.696 and -2.682, respectively, and the odds ratios are about 7 times). When the 
chairperson’s credit rating improves, the borrower will tend to access finance from low credit 
risk banks without “HCCL” (the coefficients are -0.002 and -0.006, respectively). This also 
indicates that if a borrower takes action to improve its credit rating, banks without “HCCL” 
are sufficiently flexible to accept such loan applications. To sum up, “HCCL” banks are not 
only short on knowledge as to how to analyze the borrower’s financial statements, but are 
also inflexible in terms of adjusting their lending policy to accept clients with a poor credit 
record. This can result in the loss of potential clients with improved credit ratings. 
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Table 4. Using Logit Model to Distinguish Credit Risk by “HCCL” Events 
Dimensions Status_02 MSBs Odds Ratio MLBs 
Odds 
Ratio 
 intercept 0.7085***  3.0584***  
Info Info_01 0.0657*** 1.068   
 Info_02   0.3966 *** 1.487 
 Info_03 -0.00042*** 1 -0.00114*** 0.999 
 Info_04 -0.1927 *** 0.825 0.0523 1.054 
 Com_01   0.3908 *** 1.478 
 Com_02   0.5363 *** 1.71 
 Com_03 -0.181 *** 0.834   
 Com_04 0.4668 *** 1.595 0.082 1.086 
Com Com_05 -0.8986*** 0.407 0.0633 1.065 
 Com_06 0.5598 1.75 9.6137 >999.999
 Com_07 0.1518*** 1.164 0.0798 1.083 
 Com_08 -0.0451** 0.956 -0.0616 0.94 
 Com_09 0.00679 1.007 0.1427*** 1.153 
 FIN_01   0.00029 *** 1 
Fin FIN_02   -0.0307 *** 0.97 
 FIN_03   -0.00116 0.999 
 FIN_04   -0.00706 *** 0.993 
 Credit_01 -0.6958*** 0.499 -2.6842 *** 0.068 
Credit Credit_02 -0.00223*** 0.998 -0.00595 *** 0.994 
     Note 1: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Note 2: The Likelihood Ratio (Chi-square value) of the Logit Model for MSBs is 2,878.19, and the 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-square value) of the Logit Model for MLBs is 1,704.57, which reflects good 
model fit at the 1% level. 
5. Conclusions 
Using logit regression models, we explored whether banks with different lending 
performances placed different levels of emphasis on information asymmetry and client credit 
records. The empirical results show that: (1) MLBs with good information transparency tend 
to establish relationships with “WORD” and “HCCL” banks. These results reveal that 
borrowers characterized by good information transparency and large size tend to establish 
multiple relationships, regardless of whether the banks are characterized by high or low 
lending performance. Banks with “HCCL” tend to build relationships with borrowers that 
have been in existence for short periods of time, especially following the approval of the 
policy for the establishment of new banks. This indicates that over-banking exists in Taiwan. 
(2) Small foreign firms, as well as MLBs with high profitability ratios, cash ratios and  R&D 
expenditure ratios prefer building relationships with high lending performance and low credit 
risk banks. Owing to the problem of over-banking, the borrowers with high financial leverage 
ratios are still adopted by banks with low lending performance. (3) MSBs and MLBs with 
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poor credit records prefer having relationships with banks with high lending performance and 
low credit risk. Moreover, in the case of where the chairperson’s credit score is increased, it is 
found that banks with high lending performance are sufficiently flexible in taking into 
consideration soft information instead of just hard information. This creates a policy that is 
not only beneficial to the lender, but is also beneficial to the borrowers. 
According to a survey from Taiwan, it was found that the MSBs that received loans from 
banks accounted for only 4% of the total in 2006 and the amount financed was less than one 
million. Therefore, if the Accounting Association in Taiwan makes an effort to introduce the 
IFRS for SMEs to these MSBs and helps them prepare financial statements periodically, it 
will help reduce the likelihood of information asymmetry and the probability of such firms 
receiving loans from banks. Moreover, banks can enhance their lending performance by 
expanding their lending activities to thousands of MSBs. It is really a four-way win policy for 
the government, banks, accounting associations and firms, and it is worth coordinating 
related units to introduce these improved policies or regulations.  
Although the empirical results indicate that client credit records are a very important source 
of information for lending activity, it is recognized that many clients cannot provide all the 
needed financial statements. This study confirms the prior research findings that integrated 
financial and non-financial indicators in the prediction defaulting model will result more 
accurate prediction rates. Moreover, we suggest the future research can refer to the method 
presented by Jacobson and Roszbach (2003), using Bivariate probit regression model to solve 
the sampling selection bias to explore what factors significantly impact the lending 
performance of banks and default of borrowers and how it work. 
Notes 
1. It is a requirement of the banking association that a lending bank check a firm’s credit 
record in the JCIC before approving each loan case. In this paper, we define “bad credit 
record in the past” as referring to those firms that have a record of default, not sufficient 
funds (NSF) or bad debts. Although checking the credit score records of the chairperson is 
not essential, most banks do so. Banks especially do this in the case of borrowers with a poor 
credit record and a relatively high risk of default. Banks will ask for collateral and the 
chairperson’s credit score above a certain threshold, even with a guarantee. Therefore, the 
information regarding the “credit score of the chairperson” released by the JCIC is essential 
in practice. 
2. According to Financial Statistics Monthly, issued by the Central Bank, at the end of 2008 
there were 7 banks that were identified as having written off bad debts amounting to over 
NT$50 billion. However, we cannot provide detailed information about these banks or 
financial holding companies, for confidentiality reasons. These 7 banks are regarded as the 
control sample. 
3. According to the report on the debt negotiation in retail finance issued by the Bankers’ 
Association, there are 8 banks that are characterized by heavy losses from credit card loans. 
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However, we cannot provide detailed information about these banks or financial holding 
companies, for confidentiality reasons. These 8 banks are regarded as the control sample. 
4. In Taiwan, publicly-held companies are permitted to issue straight bonds, but only listed 
and over-the-counter (OTC) companies are allowed to issue convertible bonds. 
5. Concerning to the operating definitions of MSBs and MLBs, please refer to Sections 3.1 
and 3.2. 
6. If the bank’s top executives are unable to examine the failure of operating strategies in 
corporate finance in depth, and they rush to expand their credit card and cash card-based 
“retail finance business”, this will result in their incurring huge losses for the second time. 
When the issuing bank and the cardholder lack risk awareness and an appropriate 
management mechanism, it will be more of a challenge for them to deal with both the direct 
and indirect impacts of credit risk. 
7. In this study, “Client credit” includes the aforementioned credit history, the type of 
organization, the industry category and financial attributes (this dimension is used only in the 
MLBs-related empirical model). 
8. As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on exploring whether banks that focus more 
attention on their loan policy will be rewarded with a better lending performance. The loan 
policy mentioned here includes collecting relevant financial information (i.e., financial 
attributes) and non-financial information (especially public credit history). 
9. According to Berger et al. (2008) and Kuo and Chen (2010), the reason for the multiple 
lender-borrower relationships is contained in five motives: (1) A bank cannot supply all funds 
needed, but dealing with numbers of banks can solve the problem. (2) The borrower can 
solve the hold-up problem through multiple banking relationships. (3) The borrower wants to 
protect itself against a premature withdrawal of credit or other services due to the distress of 
their banking relationship so that they can maintain their own creditworthiness. (4) To avoid 
the loss of relationship banking due to the tightness of credit policy. (5) To focus on the costs 
and benefits of the Bank in relation to supervision. 
10. These factors may affect the bank’s loanable funds and some factors may be subject to 
restrictions in the laws and regulations and not just result from information transparency. For 
example, the amount that banks lend to individual enterprises must not exceed 5% of its net 
worth even if the enterprise has good credit quality and information transparency, unless it is 
for syndicated loans. 
11. For example, after the policy for approving the establishment of new private banks was 
approved, there resulted the phenomenon of over-banking. This caused banks to relax credit 
conditions to attract customers. After 2008, the financial tsunami and the European debt crisis 
resulted in banks adopting a more conservative attitude in dealing with loan applications.  
12. Because selecting the best client can only earn the bank normal returns and it is unable to 
generate excess returns. 
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13. Hypothesis 2 aims at exploring how borrowers with different credit records build banking 
relationships with banks possessing different levels of credit risk. The prior research literature 
discussed “the relationship between the borrower’s financial performance and banking 
relationships.” It also explored “the relationship between the borrower’s credit quality and the 
operating performance of banks (especially foreign and domestic banks or state-owned or 
private banks).” There is no mention of the issue of how borrowers with different credit 
records build banking relationships with banks possessing different degrees of credit risk. 
Therefore, we provide the inference based on the principles of lending management and 
portfolio theory. 
14. Taiwan approved the registration of more than 1.5 million enterprises, but only about 
140,000 enterprises borrowed from banks. Because of this, the population here is composed 
of the data contained in the credit database of the Joint Credit Center in 2007, which did not 
indicate the total numbers of enterprises registered throughout the country. Moreover, the 
results from 2006-2008 are quite similar, so that we only discuss the results for 2007. 
15. In lending practice, banks generally require enterprises that apply for loans to  
provide financial statements for the past three years. Therefore, if the empirical period 
periods described by creditor banks extend from 2006 to 2008, then the corresponding  
empirical periods for the borrowers extend from 2003 to 2008. 
16. In this study, the sample did not exclude “policy loans”. We found that the state-owned 
banks are the most willing to promote loans with the government. Since the sample 
characterized by this attribute still accounts for less than 1% of the overall sample, it does not 
affect the reliability and validity of the empirical results. 
17. This classification method is based on the first edition of the Joint Credit Information 
Center’s credit scoring models. The Corporation Act was revised in 2001. At that time, the 
competent authority, based on the principles of corporate autonomy, deleted the regulation 
that capital exceed NT$500 million. In this study, we still include this category of 
information content.  
18. According to the classification criteria of MLBs, either a capital or a borrowing amount 
of more than NT$30 million will qualify. In our populations, there are 13,266 observations 
that belong to MLBs. These are categorized as “non-publicly held & no financial statements,” 
and therefore we exclude them form our empirical test, because of “no financial statements, 
no financial variables.” 
19. It is mentioned here that the industry classification of borrowers can also be used in the 
criteria under the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the OTC Exchange Center. Due to the 
significance of and differences in the information, the content is not obvious. We thus use the 
classification criteria of the credit-scoring models provided by the Joint Credit Information 
Center.  
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20. In addition to the four variables above, we also considered the rate of return on total 
assets and the debt ratio during the process of developing our empirical models. However, 
due to the possibility of multicollinearity with the profitability ratio and financial leverage 
ratio, we finally abandoned them. 
21. Brick-Palia (2007) regarded the collateral provided by the company as inside collateral, 
and the collateral or personal guarantee provided by top management as outside collateral. In 
this study, we use the borrowing firms as our sample, and because each firm has a number of 
secured and unsecured loans, we do not use the method of Brick-Palia, which took the 
variable of collateral into consideration. Instead, we use the credit record of the enterprise in 
the past (Credit_01) and the credit score of the chairperson (Credit_02). 
22. The value of the dependent variable only has the meaning of “classification”, and has 
absolutely nothing to do with the numerical value.  
23. The control samples refer to MSBs that build relationships with banks without “WOBD” 
and “HCCL”. 
24. To be specific, for the borrowers of banks with “WOBD”, the control samples are defined 
as the borrowers of banks without “WOBD”. When the research object is the borrowers of 
banks with “HCCL”, the control samples are defined as the borrowers of banks without 
“HCCL”. 
25. According to the dependent variables in formulas (1) and (2), which refer to the ratios of 
event occurrences relative to their not occurring, we take the natural logarithms. For 
simplicity, we simply use tendencies and preferences in favor of measuring the variables, and 
hope it will not result in a misunderstanding on the part of the reader. 
References 
Agarwal, R., & Eiston, J. A. (2001), Bank-Firm Relationships, Financing and Firm 
Performance in Germany. Economics Letters, 72, 225-237. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00427-X 
Berger, A. N., Klapper, L. F., Peria, M. S. M., & Zaidi, R. (2008). Bank ownership type and 
banking relationships. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(1), 37-62. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2006.11.001 
Berger, A. N., & Thakor A. V. (1994). Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely 
Repeated Credit Market Game. International Economic Review, 35(4), 899-920. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527003 
Brick, I. E., & D. Palia (2007). Evidence of jointness in terms of relationship lending. Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 16(3), 452-476. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2007.01.001 
Diamond, D. W. (1989). Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets. Journal of Political 
Economy, 97(4), 828-862. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1832193 
Jacobson, T. & K. Roszbach (2003). Bank Lending Policy, Credit Scoring and Value-at-risk, 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting  
ISSN 1946-052X 
2014, Vol. 6, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/ajfa 197
Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(4), 615-633. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00254-0 
Kuo, B.Y., & Chen, J.T. (2012). Bank ownership types and multiple relationships with 
corporate clients. Academia Economic Papers, 40(1), 111-161. 
Li, M. Y. (2005). Building and verification of the credit scoring model of banks-Evidence 
from Taiwan’s SMEs, Master’s Thesis, Graduate school of Finance, Shin Hsin University. 
Lummer, S. L. & McConnell, J. J. (1989). Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process 
and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements. Journal of Financial Economics, 
25(1), 99-122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90098-6  
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 
187-221. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505916  
Petersen, M., & Rajan, R.(1994). The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from 
Small Business Data. Journal of Finance, 49(1), 3-37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2329133 
Ruan, Z. Z., & Jing, Y. K. (2003). A study of credit scoring on SMEs. Credit Information, 
Monthly, Oct. Joint Credit Information Center. 
Ruan, Z. Z., & Jiang, J. C. (2004). Building and verification of the Credit scoring model on 
Taiwan enterprises. Credit Information Monthly, June. Joint Credit Information Center. 
Shen, C. H., & Wang, J. A. (2005). Does Bank Relationship Matter for a Firm Investment and 
Financial Constraints? – The Case of Taiwan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13, 163~184. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.07.004 
Zhang, D. C., Lin, Y. L. & Huang J. K. ( 2006). Industrial differences and enterprise financial 
crisis model. Taiwan Banking and Finance Quarterly, 7(4), 1-26. 
Zeng, X. H., Sun, Y.Z., & Wu, R. S. (2009). An analysis of corporate crisis warning-A logit 
modeling empirical test with financial indicators. Bank of Taiwan Quarterly, 60(2), 154-186. 
 
